I have maintained, since 9/11, that the most important countries to watch from the perspective of any sort of "war on terror" are Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The most virulent enemies of both the West and East are incubated and harvested in the madrassas and local majids in places like Riyadh and Karachi. Wahabbism and Salafism stand at the frontline of the global jihad, and these jihadis seem real comfortable in Pakistan and Saudi.



The crisis, or series of them, currently facing Pakistan and its tightrope walker of a President, may perhaps prove to be a turning point in the war on terror. Furthermore, the problems that Pakistan currently faces expose the fractures that are emblematic of the countries within what is referred to as the Muslim world. It is a set of complex dynamics that are often oversimplified by Western commentators who would liek to simply explain instability as the result of islamic extremists. The deteriorating situation in the aftermath of the Lal Masjid fiasco is only one side of the assault on a fragile Pakistani establishment. There is still the ongoing crisis of democracy resulting from the firing of the Supreme Court Judge and the subsequent protests. What makes the apparent lack of transparency concerning Musharef's decision about the judge all the more troubling, is the fact that with an election upcoming, the President's posisiton is tenuous, and his mandate withering.


While the specifics of each case will differ, there are certain thematic consistencies to be found when comparing Pakistan to the Arab nations. All are dealing with a resurgent form of radical Islam, specifically a Wahhabi and Salfist based militancy (major exceptions being Lebanon and Iran), all have leaders whose popular legitimacy is questionable at best, and all have grassroots democratic and progresive movements that are challenging both religious fundamentalist and authoritarian leaders and are more often than not completely ignored by Western commentators. The so called Cedar Revolution in Lebanon got plenty of attention but no real critical coverage, and the same seems to be happening with the what I will call the barrister protests in Pakistan. The fact remains that expedience and convenience allow the West to ignore the complexities of these countries, complexities that are the product of histories that generally go ignored, as well as a present that finds nations dealing not only with internal change, but rapid and often jarring global change.

As for prognostication, the Islamists will increase their influence in Pakistan. NATO's handling of the situation in Afghanistan and the Pakistani military's (perhaps justified) heavy hand in dealing with the Lal Masjid will bring even more supporters into the fold. Meanwhile, as Musharaf struggles to put out so many fires, while simultaneously attempting to please his Western masters, the true needs of the Pakistani people will remain unattended to. And if the state cannot solve the problems of fully funded public education and social benefits programs, Pakistans poor will continue to send young men to the few places that can guarantee them a senblance of education, 3 square meals a day, and the sense of belonging: The Salafi madrassas built by Saudi petro-dollars.

I don't know what to say. The Guardian lead with the story, the headline something like "Nothing to celebrate in birth of Hamastan." Haniyeh meanwhile says that despite the dissolution of the government by Abbas, the cabinet and parliament wil continue to function within the bounds of the "law." The most important and perhaps telling moment of Haniyeh's statement involved the explicit denial that anything like a "Hamastan" is in the works for the residents of Gaza, and that the Islamic resistance movement has no intention of breaking Gaza off from the Fatah controlled West Bank.

Fatah is moving on Hamas in Ramallah and throughout the West bank as I write this. Fatah's dominance there hopefully will be enough to deter Hamas from attemtping a full scale engagement. However, as is too often the case in internecine strife, rationality and strategy often play second fiddle to the coefficients of revenge and vindication. as fatah moves on Hamas supporters and known Izzedine al-Qassam members in the West Bank, don't expect them to greet with hearty smiles and salaams.

Let's pray that the West Bank does not become a tinderbox. Let's hope no one strikes a match if it does.

In my previous post, I said I would follow the situation in Gaza, and keep you dear reader apprised of my thoughts on the developments of those events. As someone who has spent the last few years learning as much about the Palestinian people as my time has, and continues to allow, I have nothing but sadness to share with you. For the last couple of hours I have been clicking through Reuters and AP photos, reading updates from the usual suspects, and my heart is made hollow.

Temptation. Tempted by frustration and anger to find someone, anyone to blame. Frustrated for all the times you tried to explain that a better possibility exists. Angry that the in your heart of hearts, you know verily no one will hear you when you say, "A people must find a way to express violence when violence is done to them, even when the pain is self-inflicted." There is no looking to Israel, there is no looking to the Western boycott of Hamas, there is no looking to a dying neocon agenda that holds Palestinian suffering as trite and irrelevant. Today, as brother spills the blood of brother, I can only look at Palestine and try to understand why, why is it that so often in the history of man suffering becomes an excuse for self-hatred, victimhood the prod of self-destruction. I can only try and understand how today the Palestinian is perhaps more like the Israeli than ever in their shared history, and I am all the more ashamed for being empty-handed and impotent.

Salaam / Shalom

In the words of Andrew Marvell . . .

Ok, so there is a lot of catching up to do. i always do this. It has been what two or three damn months! Anyhow, I'm back.

I will spend this week on the ongoing situation in Gaza and of course Iraq. but I want to get a couple of items out of the way first. The last entry was about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, andI actually just got finished reading about further arrests, I believe 19 was the number. These wer supporters, rank and file guys. Mubarak hasn't gotten to the candidates themselves yet, but give it time. Dictatorships sometimes need a little time to grow. The governments timing of course, is perfect, as Egyptians will soon be heading to the "polls" for legislative elections. Expect some rough demonstrations in Cairo if the arrests continue up until election day. Also expect an increase in Ikhwan influence in the parliament. Repression will only make them stronger, and that may end up cutting both ways for ordinary Egyptians.

I need to toot my own horn for just a minute. One of the things I have done on and off with this blog is not just prognostication but prediction. I would to start betting people, sort of like that market scheme DARPA had tinkered with to evaluate intelligence as market commodities. The reason I bring this up is because Turkey's is moving on it's Iraqi border to launch possible cross-border operations against PKK elements in Kurdish Iraq. I called that! It was the reason I started looking for A Turkey expert to develop a book on Turkey's role in this "new" Middle East. Anyhow, still waiting for this one to play out. The US can ill afford instability in the only oart of Iraq that has so far been relatively calm.

So watch for Gaza this week. Masalemah!

Let freedom Strain

Hosni Mubarak and his ruling party opened up the Egyptian constitution to a reform referendum that was apparently voted on by about 63 people. Ok, maybe a few more than that, but I believe Reuters used the word "trickle" when describing the "queues" at the polling place. So what got about 3% of Cairo's voting age population in such an enthusiastic furor? The 34 legislative reforms seek to, in Mubarak's words, "protect the republic from terrorism." It turns out that this is best accomplished by banning religious parties from participating in elections. I wonder who they had mind?



Ok, Maybe they didn't have Hassan al Bana in mind, so much his political offspring. The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest opposition group in the country, and suddenly finds itself in possession of even more rhetorical ammunition. One can expect both a short term surge in Ikhwan popularity, as well as increasing pressure for Gamal Mubarak to announce definitively that he has no designs on his father's position. I find it unlikley that the latter will actually occur, and if Gamal does in fact succeed his father as president, it may prove the tipping point. The current regime can ill afford a practical alliance between the Ikhwan and Ayun Nur's progressive ranks.

By the way, where is the U.S. State Department? Surprised they miss an opportunity to chastise friends for making light of the rule of law. Oh wait, Hosni is on our side. He's on of the good dictator Arab guys. Right.

No international issues today. I am trying to finish this book review for Al-Jadid magazine, and am helping someone with a screenplay for a short film he is developing. So, I haven't had much time to really digest and regurgitate. I do have one quick question though. Whither Afghanistan? With all the attention paid to the troop "surge" in Iraq, did anyone happen to notice that there has been a request for about 4500 more troops in Afghanistan? Not quite as large a surge as in Iraq, however, it is large when thought of in terms of the percentage of soldiers already there. So what's going on? Is the Taliban really capable of creating such stiff resistance, or are we witnessing that famed and fabled Pashtun invincibility? History (read British, Soviet) should contain enough cautionary tales warning potential aggressors of the tenacious Afghan mujahideen.

But then Bush doesn't strike me as much of a history buff.

Personal notes. Roseville sucks. Its the heart of Placer County, which apparently, prides itself on being quite possibly the most conservative county in California, giving the OC a run for its fiscally responsible money.

Fun Stuff

Linkages . . .

I can't believe this blog is still here after what, almost two years? I have been blogging on a private site called kanzaman, but I had to trash it because I screwed up the website and didn't have the time or patience to put humpty back together again.

So linkages has multiple meanings . . .

Just read Schmuel Rosner;s blog on Haaretz. He brings up the issue of the so called "linkage" that exists between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the larger regional morass in the Middle East. I don't want to go into the specifics of his argument, which is largely based on an Iranian writer by called Taheri. Rather, I want to throw my hat into this contentious ring . . .

The question of linkage has floated about for some time now, but most recently reared its head in the Baker-Hamilton report, in which Baker makes the claim that making progress on the Arab-Israeli front is vital to convincing European and Arab leaders of the viability and credibility of American actions in the region. The logic follows thus: Solve the question of Palestine and Israel, and garner support in Iraq, Iran and Syria. I don't think Baker's theory will actually work in practice, but that is neither here nor there. The question is, does this linkage actually exist?

Taheri argues that there is no such linkage, at least not a deep structural linkage. There is opportunism for sure. Arab leaders from Hosni Mubarak to the King of Jordan use their ostensible support of the Palestinians as a means of propping up unresponsive and often corrupt regimes. Furthermore, terrorists of the al-Qaida ilk cite the crisis and US-Israeli cooperation as a major justification in their war.

But does a resolution to the conflict make all of this disappear. Well, in a sense, yes. However, one must remember that dictators and terrorists (and often democracies) are very adept at creating new justifications for their nefarious activities, just as the old ones begin to leak.

Taheri's view is that no structural linkage exists, that the Palestinian question is in fact, at the periphery of the larger set of critical conflicts. I argue that the conflict may not have the kind of structural linkage that Baker-Hamilton suggest, i.e. Make things better in Israel-Palestine and things will be easier in Iraq. However, a linkage does exist in the minds of the people of the region. We cannot expect that the people of the Arab world suffer from the same parochial outlook that we here stateside do, not knowing what happens in the next country over. In the minds of the Arab people, and throughout the Muslim world to an extent, Palestine represents the brutal and ultimate logic of a set of policies that they see as trained directly on them and their homes. The Israeli occupation of Palestine, an occupation that has turned Gaza and the West Bank into virtual open-air prisons, illuminates in horrific scope and detail a worst of possible worlds, whose shadows threaten to loom in Iran, Syria, and have already darkened Iraq.

So yes, a linkage exists. It is in the psychology of the colonized where conflicts that are strategically disparate to the colonizer are made cohesive and interrelated. The Arab street asks, how can such a crime continue for so long, while still others are freshly committed. Solving the Arab-Israeli conflict is not panacea, but it will go no short way in achieving still greater realities of social justice and equality in the region.

bama

OUTCOMES . . .

If you look back to my 11/4 blog entitled "Pere Arafat," You will ntice that I had predicted the political participation of Hamas in Palestinian elections. The thing I didn't predict was the overwhelming success of their candidates in Gaza. Without getting into the varied explanations for why the Reform and change lists did so well, I want to briefly discuss why this is a positive thing.

Hamas has been popular for some time. They have been largly the one organization that many Palestinians, particularly in Gaza can look to for assistance and resistance. Part of their popularity comes from the fact that they are seen as uncorruptable, in contrast to the deep corruption and nepotism of Fatah. However, up until now, Hamas has had really very little to lose. They had popularity without authority and could thus operate with relative impunity vis a vis the Palestinians. Now, Hamas will have a real stake in what happens on the ground. There is now something to lose, that is, legitimate authority. With a political stake, Hamas will be forced to consider its actions in terms of political returns, and the success of agendas will be dependant on sustaining electoral support.

I stil believe that as the political operatives in Hamas become further entrenched in the process, there will be a split within the organization. This is a fairly common occurence within revolutionary groups, the most popular example being the IRA, but it has happenned in other movements as well. Such a splintering will grant the political arm only more legitimacy, though it may initially threaten its internal structure.

The politcal ascendancy of Hamas presents unique problems for both Fatah and Israel as well. The PA cannot sideline Hamas as being simply a security issue. THey will have to deal with them as political operatives, as it is likely that Hamas will win a larger number of seats in this years assembly elections. The problem for Israel is compounded by the fact that Hamas has long held among the most anti-Israeli agendas of all groups operating inside of Palestine. The reaction in the past has been targeted assasinations and relegating Hamas agents to the realm of terrorists. The old respons simply won't do; Israel will not reasonably be able to deal with democratically elected officials in the same way as they did with bomb-makers and spirtual leaders.

What does it all mean for the peace process? There is still quite a bit to play out. If nothing else it means that negotiations on the Palestinian side will be more complex and will likely come to the table with a deeper set of demands, hopefully more representative of the overall needs of the people. It will also be a real test of Abbas' leadership, now that he is not simply the voice of an overwhelming Fatah authority. Just as Hamas now has a real stake, Fatah will have to respond to the fact that the Palestinians have activated their desire to see Hamas help determine the agenda.

All Hails, democracy by force!

The people of Iraq will go to the polls this weekend in what may be the closest thing to legitimate elections since the 1950s. I want to make clear just what we are looking at here as this “historic” moment comes to pass.

The first problem is that you cannot have a legitimate election in the presence of an occupying foreign power. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the fact that the U.S. is the only real source of security means that only those political operatives who can reach some level of consensual cooperation with the appointed interim government have the necessary logistic resources to build power bases and campaign in any meaningful way. The only way you can succeed is to collaborate, in other words, because the only security is provided from without.

The second problem is that, to paraphrase Natan Sharansky, elections are only the most conspicuous aspect of democracy, and hardly the most important. A free election is not the foundation of a democracy, but rather the symptom of a series of institutional relationships that foster a political system in which the vote can react to the exchange of forces within these institutions. This is something that we forget in the U.S. And this is why, when the Iraqi election takes place the Bush administration will be all smiles and triumphalism. For most of us here, the vote is the only real contact we have with our ostensible democracy. Therefore, we come to imagine that an election that takes place anywhere in the world is the sign of a functioning democracy.

The day of the vote will be bloody. This will not come to pass as it did in Afghanistan, where the security situation was vastly less complicated. The insurgency will not wane after the election. On the contrary, the results of the election will be interpreted as further evidence of the occupations infiltrative and divisive nature and will breed only more injustice on both sides. Civil war is perhaps long overdue in Iraq, and while the Kurdish north has remained relatively quiet during the war, the city of Kirkuk may soon become another flashpoint, another Falluja, another Mosul.

The elections will only be a new beginning, not an end, to this great crime.

Throwing Rice

Poor Dr. Rice. She is being called a liar, she has had her integrity "impunged," and is likely to win an overwhleming majority of votes in the senate confirmation for Secretary of State.

So what has the Dems suddenly behaving like the protectors of the people? Why the sudden vociferous and relentless pursuit of honesty and honour in the face of Dr. Rice's imminent ascension? Beats me. It seems that the possibility of winning back the house in 2006 has caused a spark in the Dem leadership, and they think now is the time to strike, with Condie playing the role of the anvil.

Don't get me wrong, i think it is great that she is being challenged in this way. How far she went in decieving the people is subject to debate, but she is no doubt an apologist for a failed and misguided foreign policy. She has playd a central role in deveoping a strategy that has isolated the states and hs likely made us less safe than before 9/11. All criticism and calling out is welcome, in fact necessary, and all together healthy for democracy.

However, i can't help but feel that the Dems are being a bit opportunistic, and not just a little partisan. Frankly, this might be the wroing war at the wrong time. Where was such vigilence and virulence when the subject of the war was first brought to the floor? Almost 1500 hundred body bags, and a near nationwide insurgency later, and the Dems decide it is time to get some teeth. I will excuse the likes of Byrd and Kennedy, because they have fought all along. But the Dems in general are making this confirmation process an issue by taking advantage of a moral highground that they should have been standing on all along. And here we are at, at the beginning of the second, yes second, Bush term, and all of the sudden there are two major parties in the United States of America.

I am sorry, but all I can say is too little too late.

What Democracy?

I am actually in the middle of going through a couple of days worth of news that i have neglected. Of course, since i have last written, Mahmoud Abbas was elected as chairman of the PA, and that will be the subject of the next post, maybe the next couple.

But before I forget, I just wanted to make a quick point. It has been speculated that Israeli Defense Forces restricted the movement of some of the Palestinian Candidates campaign running inot the election. It may not matter, being that there was no real viable candidate other than Abbas. What is important, is that other than restricted movement of potential candidates, the elections are genereally being regarded as fair and reasonably uncorrupted.

The obviousness of where this is going makes the reality of the situation that much more absurd. We had to invade a country to bring democracy to the Middle East. Yet perhaps the single most embattled people of the region seemed to be able to able to get on just fine without us.

What gives?

more later . . .

Just a few quick words today.

Much is being made of the upcoming electoral crisis in Iraq. The greater fear at this moment is that the Sunni minority will not be able to mobilize in order to produce viable candidates for the parliament. The logic follows that the Sunni minority will already feel itself the loser in the Shia/Kurd mobilization towards democratic representation, and that the continuing violence in the Sunni Triangle is such that will prevent a significant turnout, thus rendering the efforts of candidates brave enough to stay in the race, bow out due to lack of projected turnout. Taken one step further, the Sunni Minority will then find itself grossly underrepresented, and the Shia and Kurd government will draft a constitution with its own interests in mind. The pundits conclusion is that this will likely sow the seeds of a long overdue civil war.

I however, due not buy this scenario, not entirely anyway. The biggest obstacle to Sunni participation is not Sunni alienation at suddenly being the powerless minority, but the Coalitions inability to stamp out an insurgency that has yet to manifest itself as being a truly popular movement among moderate Sunnis. The Sunnis themselves have every incentive to participate in elections, precisely because they are outnumbered nearly three to one. What good would a sectarian crisis due to such a minority. The problem thus lies in the lack of political organization within Sunni dominated areas as a result of constant warfare. If the US really wants to avoid a civil war, they will find a way to deal with the insurgency that does not further deteriorate the delicate acquiescence of moderate Sunnis, and of an Iraqi population that wants to simply move on.

Tomorrow, the Wolves.

The Dangers of my growing gut

I have been neglecting the blog. There is simply no excuse. However, don't think I am at a loss to manufacture one. The reelection of George Bush, the death of Arafat and the uncertainty of the future PA, the continuing violence in Iraq. Well its hard to stay focused and positive, it is difficult to continue to spend time engaged in the details of despair, the stories of death, and the myriad unknowns that surround the world of war and peace. Ultimately, I had to retreat a bit, and, as they say, relax and enjoy myself a bit.

Ok, I am done enjoying myself.

Mr. Blair has just finished a visit to Israel and Palestine. He seems pretty well bent on strengthening the position of Mahmoud Abbas and the ostensibly new PA. For Blair, this is an opportunity to gain some credibility both at home and in Europe. The sense is that Blair, by aggressively pursuing a return to the roadmap, can make up ground that he has lost in Iraq. It has long been the ambition of American Presidents to find a solution to the Mid-East conflict, and now it seems to be the ambition of an English Prime Minister. Yet Blair's initiative seems a bit premature, inasmuch as the leadership of the PA has yet to be established, though it seems unlikely that anyone will emerge other than Abbas. For Blair, this is less a strong possibility than a foregone conclusion. Perhaps a concession to his his American counterpart?

THe new Year will bring the eventuality of Iraqi elections. I haven't yet assessed the range of possibilities at this point, and they will follow in a future post. However, what seems apparent now is that Afghanistan will prove the exception, rather than the rule. I think the ultimate goal of the occupation will not be to see that elections take place safely, as much as that they do not descend uncontrollably into the proverbial civil war that has become the elephant in the room.

More later.

Happy holidays.

Pere Arafat

There seem to be conflicting reports coming out of Paris today concerning the condition of Yasir Arafat. If he is not already dead, he likely will be soon. The Israeli government seems to be preparing for worst case scenarios, including widespread rioting in Gaza and the occupied territories. Palestinian authorities, including SAeb Erekat, seem to be taking a rather cautious apporach to announcing developments in the Chairman's situation, which generally leads me to believe the worst.

In a way, Sharon and the US are getting exactly what they have wanted for a long time. Of course, the same applies for many Palestinians, who have long held that Arafat is not the best man for the job so to speak. I tend to agree with them. Among such Palestinians, we find both the preogressive, pro-democratic movements, which had previouly been epitomized by Edward Said, as well as the less-savoury elements in the conflicts, by which I mean the beards.

The crucial elements at play are this: Bush's reelection means that he is likely to pursue the same radical shift in policy that he introduced in the Rose Garden Earlier this year, that is to admit to a significant change of the ground situation, admitting the permanence of a certain pecentage of Israeli settlements. This was also significant in that the decision to alter a long standing policy was done without arafat even being invited to the table. The death of Arafat will likely perpetuate this kind of one-sided diplomacy, at least until a legitimate center can be established within the PA.

The other likely outcome of this will be the splintering of Hamas into a radical armed faction, and one that will attempt to broaden the agenda and seek legitimate political authority. I won't place a time frame on this, it may be a rather rapid process, being that the destruction of Hamas Leadership has already weakened its overall cohesion. Is it possible that Hamas does not take the road of groups like SinnFein or the Akali DAl? Of course, but I doubt it. The fact is that Arafat has for a long time now been losing legitimate authority over security operations because Hamas has been in the ascendant. Hamas also knows that once it can attain proper political authority, it can no longer be held to the margins by either the Israelis or the international community. The difficulty lies in making a clean break with militant operations, which would otherwise mar the legitimacy of political operatives.

wait and see, that is the lesson of the day . . .

Of Heartache and tears . . .


Last nights election came down to some stupid state that I have never been to, and have absolutely no intention of going to. I think it is called Ohio, but I can’t be sure. Anyways, perhaps the single most significant election of my lifetime was concluded while I slept. I am a great sleeper. On the morning of 9/11 my neighbor came to wake me and tell me the towers were on fire. I told him, please no games, can’t you see I am trying to sleep. So yes, once again, I have slept through one of the single most important moments of American History. But I feel better now having told you that.


Of course, I know well that to talk about Ohio in such a way betrays a rather Philistine understanding of the electoral system. What does the Kerry defeat reveal, really? Over an above, it means that things are drastically worse than we had previously thought. The failure of the left and progressive ranks is not in the inability to articulate a vision for America, whether it be reformist or altogether revolutionary. There is no shortage of programs. The problem seems to lie in the inability to translate the language of those programs to the broader population. How can the left go from having internalized its beliefs and living out the ideals and ideas that sustain it, while also making a convincing case to the all the people who currently support the regime. Bush’s victory was, I dare say, decisive. The fact remains that the left is left squabbling and complaining, and indeed put besides itself. We cannot imagine how such a thing could happen. Yet it happened, and this time without the clear legal and constitutional conflicts of 2000. So perhaps the problem is that the left has been a bit too sure of itself, too comfortable in its truth, warmly bundled up in baby blankets of uncritical belief.

And here, I admit to playing the same game. Is there really such a thing as the “left” in America? Well, surely there is, but is it something that can be described as uniform and monolithic? Indeed, the answer is emphatically no. Thus far, the hegemony of the idea of difference has allowed the left to content itself with being defined as a set of movements whose ultimate aims may at some point intersect, like a series of Venn diagrams of target audiences. But those movements are themselves fueled by their singularity as specific critiques. More often than not, if there is some sense of cohesion, it takes the form of critiques of globalization and capital. The left has at least this as a unifying theme, that so many of the particular social justice issues can be reduced to a discussion of the intersection of power and capital. Of course, one easily wedges into this line, and disrupts the problem of capital-critique by examining the participation of the rebels within the framework of the very same system. It is old, and perhaps not particularly interesting to accuse such movements as hypocritical, nut this is a central argument that is easily cast by those who find left-oriented ideas to be beyond the pale.
My goal at this point is not to simply describe what comes next. I don’t know what comes next. What I do know is that, the republic is resilient, and Bush being reelected may force those of us on the left to rethink the way we have been conducting ourselves. WE need to ask what it is not that is not being communicated, and we need to stop playing the blame game. Critique of power is infinitely valuable. But it also has to be constantly renewing. We cannot allow ourselves to flog the dead horse and fall into the kind of solipsism repetition that allows our political enemies to accuse of naivete and infantilism.

So lets start discussing the future, because I can guarantee you Karl Rove is thinking about it as we speak.

GEEZ....

I seem to have forgotten that this blog exists. Ok, so I will try again and keep this up to date. With things the way they are in the world, I hope you can forgive my laxity.

In any event, I am at work, so I won't be able to do anything in detail. That will have to wait. Moreover i don't
actually have a topic for a post in mind, yet.

Tomorrow, tomorrow . . .

LARSHA NENGARHAR

Ok, alot has happened since my last post. The death of Rantissi, the proposed pullout from Gaza continued violence in the Shia south and Falluja etc. I Don't know that I have really made sense of it all yet, so I won't try and synthesize it all right now. Mostly, I will attempt to focus only on a very general swath of analysis.

Hosni Bubarak and Prince Abdullah, two of our closest Arab allies, have recently stated that anti-American sentiment is at an all time high. This is of course to be expected. However, what does this translate to? The historic shift in policy vis-a-vis the Palestine question is of course indicative of the problem. Moreover, there seems to be no hesitation on the part of the administration to effectively condone extra-judicial killings by the Israeli Defence Force. I may have intimated that the events of May (the rise of al-SAdr, the Spanish bombings, the Yassin assasination) marked a turning point in the so called war on terror, and now we are starting to see the what this shift effectively entails. For one, the shift seems to be leading to a radical approach to the Palestinian question. Never before has such a decision as the pullout in Gaza been undertaken without the PA even being at the table. Ultimately, this, combined with the assassinations of Yassin and Rantisi, will lead to a further disintegration of Arafat's popular power, and the increased influence of Hamas. One can speculate then, that this decision to sideline the participation of the Palestinian Authority is strategic, aiming at the delegitimization of the potential central organizing premise (HAMAS) thus ensuring that popular leadership in Palestine is left out altogether. If the PA can't protect the Palestinians from the diplomatic backroom maneuvors of Bush and Sharon, Hamas will retake a central role in both poltical enterprise as well as armed resistance, thus rendering them personna non grata at the negotiating table. It is unlikey that Hamas, in light of recent events, will soon show a Sinn Fein type of character and find some way to access diplomatic arrangements.

More later . . .

Najaf

As I remarked in my previous post, there is a seige in Falluja. Many of you probably know that the occupation is currently positioning to do the same thing in Najaf, the holiest site in the Shiite tradition. Now clearly, this is where things get a bit dicey. I won't go into details about what this seige might mean if it goes badly. I would prefer to wait and see. However, I would like to share a bit of history. One of the things about a lot of Americans (myself included) is that I don't imagine we have a very good understanding of Islam, either religiously or historically. This may be obvious, but rather than simply point to the bare-faced reasons for our ignorance, allow me to take a moment to shed to a little light:

"The valley that Abraham wanted to buy is called the Valley of Peace (Wadiu's-Salaam), and it is related on the authority of the first Imam, that Ali once said that this ValIey of Peace is part of Heaven and that there is not a single one of the believers in the world, whether he dies in the east or west, but his soul will come to this Paradise to rest.2 "As there is nothing hidden in this world from my eyes," Ali went on to say, "I see all the believers seated - here in groups and talking with one another."

How Najaf was given its name is explained in the tradition. At first there was a mountain there, and when one of the sons of Noah refused to enter the Ark, he said that he would sit on this mountain until he would see where the water would come. A revelation came therefore to the mountain, "Do you undertake to protect this son of mine from punishment?" And all at once the mountain fell. to pieces and the son of Noah was drowned. In place of the mountain a large river appeared, but after a few years the river dried up, and the place was called Nay-Jaff, meaning, "the dried river."3

And so as per the prediction of Abraham, Imam Ali was buried here. "

this is taken from a website, "History of the shrine of Imam Ali ibn muhammad"

Falluja

Just a few quick words. As you may have noticed, the idea here is to make some sense of the current global crisis, particularly as it applies to the war in Iraq. The kind of analysis that I hope to offer depends largely on the broader historical moments rather than the ever-present news flash of casualty numbers or fire fights.

I do want to say a couple things about the current siege at Falluja. Reports are emerging that suggest that the Marine battalion laying siege to the Sunni "stronghold" claim that the over 600 dead are bodies of militants. Of course, the doctors and attendants at the local clinics claim otherwise.

I am not going to overstate the obvious here. The situation on the ground and its eventual evolution into either chaos or pacification will bear out the truth. What I would like to point out is something that Virilio has suggested in "Strategy of Deception," in the context of the Kosovo conflict. That in both cold-war conflicts and those since the collapse of the USSR, military interventions by the United States often distinguish themselves from the "traditional" idea of warfare in as much as there is a disproportion between civilian and military casualties. The amount of dead US soldiers in the Vietnam conflict rings in the ears of all who lived through those times, though rarely do we here of the 2-3 million Vietnamese civilians who lost there lives. Virilio suggests that the concept of mutually assured destruction that was inaugurated by Hiroshima and intimated at in a different way by the holocaust suggested that the Clausewitzian vision of war as an extension of politics means war against civilian populations. We are seeing this nightmare scenario played out in Iraq, magnified in the siege of Falluja, in which the people who we seek to liberate, now fall victim to the guns of the liberators. I

Some would love to suggest that the conflagration is the result of bad Pentagon planning. I would say the probably was planning any of this at all. You don't need a Pentagon meeting to understand that occupation is a bad idea. Even if you believed in spreading western democracy, only a fool would be so regressive as to put American boots on soil that had hardly cleared the footprints of the British. Falluja will come to symbolize the lesson that seems all too hard for the West to learn: Occupation is a losing venture. Forget about the fact that we are currently attempting to occupy a country in place and time that has had long enough to realize that Western powers no longer can afford or even sustain empires as they once did.

Whatcha say about my imam?

Ok, sorry for the goofy title.

Just a few brief comments. Apparently the narcoleptic is turning into my Iraq war journal. I won't apologize, simply write.

The current insurgency across the south of the country, the continued siege in Falluja, are disheartening certainly. As much as I might like to jump to conclusions and tell you the country is on the brink of a Vietnam-like war of attrition, it is still a bit early to tell. As I have mentioned before, Ayat-allah Sistani provides the barometer. Grand Ayat-allahs are sort of like a cross between a high court judge and a theologian. These guys have patience and they have wisdom, and certainly do not make flippant remarks or actions. Moqtada al-Sadr derives his authority from lineage only, not possessing any of the usual credentials. That was just for clarification.

So as I said, Sistani is the barometer. When he condemns occupation aggression, and not Sadr's actions this is measured. With this, he retains credibility and unity with the most despondent of Shia. The action is similar to Arafat's reaction to Hamas in the past, in which he understood that full fledged allegiance would mean trouble, yet outright condemnation was worse. Sistani may well be the most important man in that country, and even after the handover of power, he will remain the one who decides the immediate future vision of Iraq.

And here is where the handover date is really key. If the level of violence between now and June 30 remains static or decreases, it is likely that Sistani will be able to continue relying upon political pressure rather than force to assert influence. If the level of violence increases, his moderate position may lose steam. The true test comes when Sistani determines the legitimacy of the new power structure. He knows that if he wants the occupation ended, it will end. He is just being patient, like a proper ayat-allah knows how.