Next in Line

With the fall of Tripoli imminent and another Arab state pressing forth into the anxious experiment of self-rule, it is important to turn our focus again to one of the states that represents the fulcrum upon which events in the region turn. As has been discussed and developed on this site, much of our understanding of the dynamics of the Middle East emerge from a structural paradigm which posits Saudi Arabia and Iran as bipolar powers in conflict for regional hegemony – what I have called in the past the “Arab Cold War” (The Iranians aren’t Arabs, but this is being played out in the Arab world, and to an extent, South Asia).

The House Al Saud built

The Saudi royal family, styled the “House of Al-Saud,” uses what is called agnatic seniority to determine ascendancy to the thrown of the kingdom. This means that the throne is passed to the oldest brother of the current king. This differs of course from what most in the west are familiar with, the system found in most European monarchies whereby the crown is passed from father to eldest child(typically, though not necessarily, a son), the technical term being agnatic primogeniture. Thus, Abdullah is currently the eldest son of the original king, Abdul-Aziz. Of his other sons, Sultan would be next in line, however, he will likely step aside due to health reasons. This leaves the probably heir to the Saudi throne as Crown Prince Nayef, former Minister of the Interior and current Second Deputy Prime Minister. Nayef is considered to be among the most conservative members of Al-Saud. As Reuters reported in 2010, most diplomats say Nayef is unlikely to pursue meaningful social reform. In fact, the crown prince was once quoted as saying that the Kingdom has “no need for elections or women in government.” Others argue that reform is inevitable and that continued foreign investment depends on Nayef being able to portray some sense of social and political progress in the Kingdom.

The future of the House of Al Saud may depend on it. With a huge majority of Saudis under the age of thirty watching Tunisia/Egypt/Libya/Syria on Al Jazeera with the rest of us, Nayef will have to chart a careful course if Al Saud expects to remain the dominant institution in the country. And if the notion of a monarchy maintaining control of its populace in midst of democratic revolutions sounds a bit medieval, well, that’s because it is. The Saudi Monarchy, as well as those of other Gulf Emirates, is a throwback to some political-evolutionary past, an atavistic transitional form in the flesh. The regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya represent a much more recent form - that of the post-colonial dictatorship – and indeed that has been proven to have outlived its usefulness. The Saudis, the Gulf Emirs and Nayef understand this full well. That’s why they participate in counterrevolution through its primary institutional instrument, the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The Council of Kings

The GCC consists of six states, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. All of these states can be described as Absolute Monarchies, excepting the UAE which is a federal monarchy. Jordan requested membership, and Morocco has been invited. The GCC operates on many levels, fostering economic, social and political cooperation through the creation of consensus based objectives for advancing interests of the monarchies in the gulf. One of the critical pieces of the GCC is the Peninsula Shield Force. This is effectively the military wing of the GCC and is intended to respond to military aggression against GCC states. It was deployed in both Gulf Wars, both times against Iraq. However, the most recent deployment of the Peninsula shield is perhaps the most crucial, and disturbing. In March of this year, the Peninsula Shield moved across the causeway that connects Saudi Arabia to Bahrain and, at the request of the Bahraini government, attempted to quell popular demonstrations for reform on the island. This set a precedent of the GCC using its military wing to oppose an internal threat against a GCC regime. This is important, because it shows us that not only is Saudi Arabia not moving towards reform within its own borders, but it is acting with increasing urgency and risk-taking with regards its GCC compatriots. One senses that the Saudi Monarchy views its co-royalists as dominoes in a game of survival against both democratic minded revolutionaries and Iranian-backed Shi’a insurgents. For Nayef and the other leaders of the GCC, history is at the doorstep, and only active counterrevolution can turn back the tide.

Going forward

This all, of course, has major implications for the United States, with our particularly special relationship to the Kingdom. What side of history will our leaders stand on when the yearning for democracy grips the streets of Riyadh? It is difficult to speculate at this point how far America will go to support the Saudi monarchy, but we must assume at the very least that if the US abandons Nayef and his coterie, it will only be on the guarantee that a deal exists between the US and the presumptive future leaders of the Saudi Arabia. There is too much at stake in the earth beneath the sands of the desert.

The State of Iraq

Iraq re-emerged in the news recently, as terror attacks left scores dead in Baghdad, Kut and other areas of the country. Though the sudden spark of violence certainly presents reason for concern, all indications seem to suggest a that the country has turned a corner, and that while the security situation may not return to pre-invasion status for some time, there is reason to be optimistic. It is vital to get a grip on the overall picture in Iraq as we approach the December 2011 deadline for the final wihdrawal of US forces from the country.

Business, and business as usual

Recently, Hassan Hadifh of the Wall Street Journal reported that Royal Dutch Shell reached an agreement with the Iraqi Oil Minitry that would yield 2 billion cubic feet/day of natural gas. Some of this quantity would be used for export in a liquified form, while some would be piped for local and regional use. The Ministry estimates that the project expects to generate 31 billion dollars in government revenues over the 25 year lifespan of the project. This is just one of many large scale foreign investment projects taking hold throughout Iraq at the moment. According to an article on "The National" website, total foreign investment is expected to reach around 90 billion dollars this year, with Turkish interests leading the way, and with investment taking place not only in the energy sector, but also in housing and urban infrastructure development.

Of course, oil and natural gas still dominate. As Josie Esnor reports in the Telegraph, "Look outside the oil sector, however, and high operational risk continues to discourage all but the most daring investor." Moreover, a greater proportion of investment inquiries remain focused on the areas in and around the Kurdish regions, like Arbil, where the security situation differs dramatically from both the Sunni heartland and the Shi'a dominated south.

Investors remain optimistic about Iraq, at least for the moment. With this in mind, it is difficult to dismiss the sense that cries of collusion weren't entirely correct; that one positive outcome in invading a country and laying waste to a great many parts of it, is the opportunity to go back in and rebuild it and thus reap the spoils of destruction. However, let's lay the most cynical readings aside for the moment. Instead, let's try and examine how the current state of things affects the average Iraqi.

Keep the Lights on

Acording the most recent "Iraq Index" produced by the Saban Institute/Brookings Institution, by virtually any measure, life in Iraq is improving. In regards the economic and investment activity discussed above, The Saban report indicates an estimated 2011 GDP growth of above 9%, with an IMF estimate that 2012 may show as much as 12.5%. From about 2008 until now, there has been steady increases in electrical kilowatt hours generated and delivered. Cellphone subscriptions are up, internet access is on the climb, and while the overall unemployment picture remains discouraging, jobs are being created in certain sectors and in certain municipalities.

Security

Furthermore, despite the most recent spate of attacks, Iraqi civilian deaths are at an all time low per annum. through July '11, the total amounted to around 800, less than one-half from 2010, and less than one-third from 2009. In addition, US military fatalities also attain to significantly lower levels than at any time during the invasion and occupation. Despite small spikes in the period from March to June of this year, US fatalities are on track to be equal or less than last years total of 60, which remains to date the lowest per annum of the war. The number of wounded will likely end up at less than half of last years total number of 389.

While the issue of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons remains significant, most of the indicators in the Saban report Index paint the piture of a ountry on the right track.

So why is Seymour Hersh so worried?

During a June 11th interview on Democracy Now, Investigative Journalist Seymour Hersh said the following:

Whatever you are hearing, Iraq is going bad. Sunnis killing Shi'as, it's sectarian war.

Hersh goes on to state that certain Baathist Sunni groups, with potential operators in the UK, are planning on declaring a provisional government, perhaps something like a shadow government, with the aim of casting the Shi'a dominated government of overtly tied to Iran. Hersh doesn't get any further into it, but there are definitely hints of the ongoing structure of support by Saudi Arabia for Sunni groups to be propped up as proxies against "Iranian Influence." Furthermore, Hersh's claim that the situation in Iraq may be used to put more pressure on the Iranians seems to correspond with recent comments made by Adm. Mike Mullen. As quoted in the Telegraph on 7/7/11, Mullen indicates that "Iran is very directly supporting extremist Shi'a groups which are killing our troops." The Admiral goes on to say that any final decision on US troops remaining in country past the December deadline "has to be done with control of Iran in that regard." Mullen doesn't provide any evidence for the claim of Iranian support, and the most recent attacks suggest that the most active groups are in fact Sunni extremists, not Shi'a groups. However, in general, this seems to point to a coming moment that will decide the immediate future stability of the country.

Hersh believes that Iraq will prove a thorn in Obama's side next year. Human Rights Watch, in its most recent report on Iraq details continued human rights abuses, including targeting Women's rights advocates and female politicians, forced female genital mutilation in the Kurdish regions, torture and severe disruptions of due process for prisoners, and severe curbs to freedom of expression. Clearly, things aren't better for everyone.

Time will tell.

Some thoughts on terror and violent resistance


Last night I spent some time talking with some friends about the subject of Palestinian resistance to the Israeli Occupation. Inevitably, despite the absence of such actions in the recent past, we came to the concept of the suicide bomber and more specifically, the attack on innocent civilian targets. In asking whether or not this stood as a legitimate weapon of resistance, it occurred to me that we may suffer from asking the wrong question. Now let me be clear, explaining the psycho-social mechanism from whence the suicide bomber arises - as opposed to condoning his activity – remains a common and well-worn strategy for those sympathetic to the Palestinian Resistance. I don’t know that I will be proposing anything different than the usual “explication” thesis. However, I like to think that my position is one step beyond explication, yet still one step short of justification.

Israel comprises an area of land approximately equivalent to the state of New Jersey. Yet, by most credible accounts possesses the 4th most powerful military on the planet, including unknown nuclear assets. To suggest that the Palestinians stand at the vanguard of some vast Islamic horde poised to push the Israelis into the Mediterranean is to abandon reality. What support the Palestinian resistance does receive from its coreligionists is nominal at best and negligible at worst. Meanwhile, the Palestinians themselves battle AH^$ Apache gunships (made in the USA) and the second largest fleet of F-16 jet fighters with homemade rockets and Kalashnikov rifles. To even suggest that the conflict is a war between two armies fails to account for the most basic facts. David and Goliath fails as an accurate analogy; rather it is as if an army of ants, is confronting a stamped of elephants. And no one is coming to the aid of the Palestinians. They are all but abandoned, save for facile “diplomatic” solidarity from governments, and plenty of rhetorical support from Arab demagogues. So what are these people to do?

There will never be a time, if the current conditions persist, when a Palestinian resistance could take on the IDF with any hope of achieving success. The best analogy for the situation can be found in American history. The Native Americans never stood a chance, mainly because the United States never regarded them as anything but a people to be conquered, and that bringing to bear the full might of the United States army provided the best means of success. The suicide bombing of innocent bus riders or café goers in Tel-Aviv, or attacks on homes in Sderot by means of katyusha rockets are desperate acts of a desperate people. And in fact, if they were able to persist, it is likely that large portions of the Israel population would encourage their government to end the occupation. Thus it is necessary for the Israeli establishment to relegate this tactic to the category of the morally reprehensible, the terroristic. The Palestinians aren’t playing by the rules, and it is evidence of their barbarism. In fact, what it reveals is the complete moral failing of the Zionist project, which regards the Palestinians, not as negotiating partners for peace, but as a conquered people with whom the details of the final capitulation (the shape and size of their reservations) must be hammered out for public consumption.

The irony is of course that Israel celebrates its own “terrorists” of the past. In July of 1946, The Irgun – Zionist nationalist militant group – bombed the King David hotel Jerusalem, killing 91 people, most of them hotel staff and British clerical workers. The group, led by future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, killed innocent civilians in order to achieve the political end of forcing the British to quit mandate Palestine and declare independence for Israel. Today, the episode would be unequivocally characterized as a terrorist attack. Today, the Irgun and the men who perpetrated the attack are regarded as national heroes in the liberation struggle for Israel.

More later . . .

Chaos in Kandahar

An old friend asked me whether or not I might share a few lines on the recent assassination of Wali Karzai. I hesitated to remark on the event until I got a chance to have brunch with a new friend, someone who has spent a lot of time in Afghanistan, and Kandahar specifically. In fact, he should be arriving there as I write this. In the interim, another key Kandahar official, Jan Mohammad Khan, also fell to assassins. The sudden power vacuum in the south generates far more questions than answers, and there is no doubt that they way forward remains intensely opaque.

My question to my friend was simple: "What happened to Wali?" Of course, I didn't expect him to point out the guilty party, but his response made me question his otherwise optimistic outlook on the overall stability in Kandahar and Helmand. The fact that the assassin was one of Karzai's own - his bodyguard, Sardar Mohammad - meant that the likelihood of discovering the true motive and intent of the assassination remains low. The Taliban taking responsibility means little, and it is unlikely that the Taliban would have much motivation for killing Karzai. As the most powerful official in Kandahar, there is no doubt that Karzai's sudden wealth stems from his play in the poppy trade, and this could only happen with coordination, and probably a direct buy in from the Talibs. More likely, the killing of Karzai, and subsequently Jan Mohammad, is the result of internecine conflict, which may well have been festering for some time.

It is tempting of course to perceive the moment as a Taliban takeover, an opportunistic venture to create a power vacuum in the south ahead of deeper US and ISAF troop withdrawal. However, it would seem a strategic blunder on the part of the Taliban to play their hand this early, when they have shown so much patience before. I suspect rather, that someone within the establishment - the corrupt and compromised establishment - felt slighted and is making there move to assert their own presence. It may even be from within the Popalzai tribe itself. An excellent Asia Times article provides some crucial background to this, and I highly recommend a read.

Turkey’s way forward

It has become a global mantra, and perhaps the most telling gauge of national elections on the planet: It’s the economy, stupid. Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and his AKP have presided over the most successful economic boom in the history of the Turkish Republic, and the electorate has rewarded them accordingly. The total growth of the Turkish economy reached 8.9% for 2010, and the ruling AKP and Erdogan received the credit for raising the living standards of many of Turkey’s rural poor as well as improving the profile of Turkey in the eyes of the global investment community.

Significant challenges remain for the Turkish people, and for its status as a truly democratic state. A recently released report from Reporters without Borders states that “It is worrying to note that all journalists are under threat, no longer just those who cover the army or Kurdish issues as was the case 15 years ago.” According to a New York Times article from March of this year, 61 journalists are currently imprisoned in Turkish. Hopefully, the improvements in the economy have resulted in improved prison conditions, lest these journalists suffer in scenes from Midnight Express. The recent case of Ahmet Sik reveals the attitude of Turkish government to critical journalists, and may even implicate the AKP in state repression on behalf of its own interests. Sik was arrested and imprisoned as part of an investigation of a group called Ergoneken, which the Turkish government and the AKP in particular accuse of attempting an overthrow of the ruling party and the government. Sik, as well as others journalists and writers arrested in this supposed action against Ergoneken, denies any affiliation with any such group, suggesting rather that the AKP led government’s attempts to silence him stem from implications Sik has made regarding the AKP’s connection to various fringe Islamist groups. Sik has produced a book called “Army of the Imam,” in which he allegedly suggests that Fethullah Gulen, a leading Conservative Islamic Cleric, exerts significant - if not total - control over the Turkish Police. Presumably this is being done with the consent of the central government. In any event, copies of the book were seized and subsequently burned by the government. Conjecture still rules the day in regards to the reliable facts in this case. However, burning books – whether they contain legitimate criticisms or unfounded conspiracy theories – is not the hallmark of a democratic state. Neither is jailing journalists.

Allowing press freedom is a necessary condition if Turkey aspires to the kind of democratic institutions that would allow it to continue its ascent on the world stage. And in some sense, it’s a simple fix: Stop arresting journalists, stupid. Secure and transparent institutions can withstand criticism and respond best to the will of the people. However, it is difficult to be secure when more complex problems loom at the door.

No problems with neighbors, except the problematic ones.

Syrian security forces, under the direction of President’s Assad’s cousin, arrested 15 children – aged 10 to 13 - in city of Deraa. When the fathers attempted to confront the security forces over the fate of the detained children, they were met with an inhuman response:

Forget them, go back to your women and make some more.
If you can’t, we will do it for you.

Erdogan and his Foreign Minister have stated clearly that Assad must make changes and accommodate the revolutionary spirit that has taken over much of Syria. Indeed, if Turkey wishes to perpetuate its momentum towards increased regional soft-power, it must stand squarely with its Arab neighbors now seeking justice and participatory governance, and facing brutal repression in the streets. Again, this may be a relatively simple thing; the AKP up to this point has welcomed the change in the region and actively presents itself as a viable Moderate Islamist party working within the framework of democratic institutions. The greater challenge - Turkey’s jihad al asghar – is with its internal neighbors.

To Kurd, or not to Kurd . . .

For Turkey, the Kurdish question often feels like an existential question. The modern nation state that Kemal Ataturk crafted from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire depended on “Turkishness” as its foundation. This notion required that anyone residing within Turkey, regardless of their actual ethnic origin declared themselves a Turk. This was not meant to suggest that someone gave up there identity, but rather identified first with the state. In some sense, the idea is similar to Americans who believe that the first allegiance of the citizen is to the United States, and only after to any nation of ethnic origin.

However, this notion of Turkishness has proved problematic for the Kurds, who have for various reasons maintained a distinct cultural identity and a yearning for a continuity of that cultural experience within either their own home land, or through a more integral experience within Turkey itself. With this in mind, it is vital that Erdogan and the Turkish establishment in general make a clear distinction between the PKK and the extreme wing of Kurdish nationalism, and the mainstream Kurdish aspirations and reflect this in national policy. The PKK must be combated, but not at the expense of Kurdish civil rights. The current debate concerning the teaching of Kurdish to Kurdish school children in the southeast provides an excellent place for Turkey to move towards practical pluralism that would integrate Kurds into the national framework. The Kurdish language instruction should accompany, and not replace, Turkish instruction, as it is vital that Kurdish school children be able to participate in the economic and civic life of the country. However, if the government allows and sponsors Kurdish language instruction, it signals to the Kurds a willingness to accept into the polity Turkish Citizens of Kurdish origin.

If becoming part of the EU remains a priority, this move towards progressive pluralism must emerge. Furthermore, the increased regional soft power now exhibited by Turkey will require that it is viewed as a state that embodies the democratic spirit that its Arab neighbors are now fighting to gain themselves.

The Arab Cold War

As complex events unfold within a complex region, it may prove instructive to view the Middle East of the moment through a wide angle lens. Libya remains a critical site, as the NATO response to Gaddafi increasingly runs the risk of rapid scope creep. Indeed, Tunisia and Egypt loom a great distance from "resolution," and the question of "what next" burns hot on all onlookers lips. In this state of liminal transiton, accompanied by myriad speculations and occasional paranoias, focusing our sights on Saudi Arabia and Iran may reveal some future trends that will aid in the making-sense process.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran represent opposite poles in a regional struggle. One major question enlivened by the Arab spring asks how much influence either nation exerts in the moment to moment development of events in the countries involved, and indeed the future of the Middle East at large. Though the analogy is far from perfect, what we are witnessing is an effective "cold war" between two states that extend influence through confessional affiliation, arms, money, and regional proxies.

King Abdullah is rather well regarded among the Saudi People. Generally, the King is viewed as a reformer, and though many aspects of his agenda fail to satisfy many constituents - particularly his reluctance to extend civil rights to women - there remains in Saudi Arabia a sense that Abdullah is bringing the country along in the right direction. This includes the ever crucial question of the economy; Saudis generally enjoy a rather high standard of living and efforts on the part of Abdullah to diversify the economy have been met with welcome arms. However, the decision to assist the regime in Bahrain with cracking down on popular protests put him square in the sights of an emerging generation that rightly demands the end of the old order from Gibraltar to the Hindu Kush. Abdullah expressed great disappointment with the US decision to let Mubarak (as if they had a choice) fall. Increasingly obvious is Abdullah's two pronged agenda; on the one hand, insulate the Kingdom from internal strife by working - however tentatively - towards reform, while also pursuing a pro-active engagement in places like Bahrain and Yemen on the basis of ensuring security. On the other hand, intervention in Bahrain and the continued stability in the Kingdom are vital to keep in check the influence of Shi'a proxies, and ultimately the only true regional rival, Iran.

Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrullah, is known as being a savvy and widely loved leader in the Arab world. That is why his recent support for Assad looms as a rather large miscalculation. Despite the brutal repression conducted by Assad's regime - including the horrific torture and murder of a 13 year old boy - Nasrullah urged the Syrians to give Assad a chance to make meaningful reforms. The call fell flat, and exposed the Hezbollah chief's nervousness and lack of foresight. It also reveals that Nasrullah and Hezbollah clearly envision a "resistance front" that runs from Tehran, through Damascus and Beirut. The stability of the Syrian regime constitutes a vital strategic component for the continued emergence of Iran as regional hegemon and beacon of the Shi'a revival. In the end, however, whatever emerges in post-Assad Syria will likely be so weak that Hezbollah's influence may even increase.

The proxies are clearly lining up, however, and at this point the future of the Iranian regime remains uncertain. Conflict between Ahmadinejad and Khamanei may not in itself signal a revolutionary moment, but the situation begs the question of how long the young people of Iran will suffer under the mullahs. What is most likely is that Khamenei will emerge triumphant from his skirmish with his suddenly rebellious president and will steer the country to the right in order to protect the Islamic Revolution while continuing to provide regional leadership to the regions Shi'a multitudes. However, as in Saudi Arabia, their exists among the youth - the exceeding majority demographic in both countries - a burning desire to bring their respective nations fully into the light of Democratic modernity. Iran's regime rushes headlong to a crucial moment, one in which its rise to greater prominence in the wake of the Iraq invasion approaches a confluence of forces that threaten its momentum. As long as both Iran and Saudi Arabia are left to deal with their external interests, the bi-polar structure of the regional power distribution allows for a relatively well organized trajectory of events.

When these two nations face their own "spring" revolutionary moments, all bets are off.

The head of the serpent

The emir of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, is dead. The crowds in Washington and New York City celebrate with good reason. The raid that eventually located and killed the murderous jihadi leader represents a major success, and indeed an incredibly bright light in an otherwise dim decade of war. At the time of this writing, the infinity loop of media omnipresence rehearses and rehashes the debate about the ultimate meaning of Bin Laden’s death. To be sure, this is a major victory. While Bin Laden long ago ceased to be a major tactical target, his death looms large on the symbolic front. Al Qaeda suffered a massive blow with this raid, even if Bin Laden no longer “runs” this thing called “the Base.” In some sense, this may well be the death blow for the organization that Bin Laden and Zawahiri started during the Afghan resistance in the 80’s.

Of course, that view must stand in the light of the wider context, specifically of the world in 2011 rather than the world of 2001. Reflecting on the Islamic world, and particularly the Arab world, the contemporary scene presents very interesting shifts and frantic dynamism. At the beginning of the millennium, Reza Aslan suggested that the Islamic world found itself in a moment of vital transition which he compared to the Christian Protestant Reformation. In Aslan’s estimation, the “soul” and future of Islam stood in the balance, tugged between the forces of secularism, moderation and extremism. The seismic shifts that Aslan presciently presented now emerge more starkly than ever. In some sense, the Al Qaeda project failed, Not simply because of the death of its Emir, but because its virulent violence mostly fell upon the heads of Muslims. In the meantime ordinary Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemeni’s and Syrians continue to struggle for freedom and rule of law. Not a Bin Laden to be found among them. Indeed, even the legalist and largely mainstream Muslim Brotherhood was late to the revolutionary show. The Arab world moved on from the extreme Salafi-Wahhabi violence of Bin Laden, and the young people of the aforementioned countries are embracing a vision that aspires towards greater integration with the rest of the globe, rather than some obscurantist vision of a global Wahabbi Khalifate.

Of course, the “beardy-weirdies,” (to quote one of my favorite recent films) are not simply going to disappear. In fact, it is safe to assume that the various local franchises of The Base will carry on, and continue to spread mayhem and violence. And mayhem is perhaps the key here. One suspects the strong possibility of local groups – in Yemen, the Caucasus, and South Asia in particular - devolving into tactics and strategies which emphasize the “love of death” over the love of life. Some noted that the Joker in the Dark Knight represented contemporary terrorism. However, Bin Laden and Zawahiri never suffered a lack of ideological vision. The Joker was simply an agent of chaos, an actor for whom mayhem was an end in itself. He is not Bin Laden, but he is Zarqawi, the figure who embodies chaos as a physical and brute force. This is perhaps the immediate future of the global jihad. With the visionary Emir buried at sea, the mujahedeen will be pushed to the fringes of the wilderness.

The moment is indeed historic. One can say that we are entering the second phase of the Islamic reformation, a version 2.0. And while secularists have achieved much in the street while the barbarians have been pushed further from the gate, hybrid and culturally promiscuous strategies such as those of Tariq Ramadan and other liberal Muslims further add depth to the field. With critical questions regarding Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arab Spring remaining unanswered, the death of Al Qaeda’s emir signals a beginning as much as an end.

Some Cursory Thoughts

When I was a freshman at UCLA, I took a class on International Relations with one Dr. Steven Spiegel. At the outset of the course, Professor Spiegel told us that one of the overarching themes in contemporary international politics was the existence of the twin forces of fragmentation and integration. I was perhaps too young to understand whether the good professor was suggesting something about the world beyond international politics, and if he was perhaps suggesting something of a metaphor for the general trajectory of civilization or the species. Nonetheless, his words ring particularly prescient to me at this particular historical moment.

Fragmentation, as Spiegel described it, could be understood as the breakup of previous constructs. Examples abound, but in the late 90’s, the experience of the war in the Balkans and the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia loomed foremost on the topical horizon. In Africa, Eritrea declared itself an independent state, breaking away from Ethiopia. And in Asia, East Timor broke from Indonesia. Peoples in Chechnya, Kurdistan, and in the Indian Punjab sought independent homelands in the midst of a major reorganizing of the global structure.


The opposing force, as Spiegel described, is integration. In this context, integration refers to the process of creating increasing interdependence's between states, and thus creating institutions and instruments that reinforce stability within these interdependent relationships. This process has come to be generally termed “globalization.” This process integrates states into larger systems, be they political, economic or geostrategic. The creation of market “blocs,” such as the European Union and the North American free trade zone, trend towards bringing the functions of individual state political-economies into uniformity, inasmuch as that uniformity and the instruments by which it is created increase political cooperation and produce efficiencies in trade and economies of scale. The dramatic decrease in transportation and communication costs at the end of the 20th and into the beginning of the 21st centuries accelerated this process of integration, which perhaps represents the greatest re-organizing of human affairs in our species history.

If integration and fragmentation describe general global processes present in the post-cold war period, then another buzz word of the 21st century may well describe the looming multi-polar moment, and the diminished global hegemony of The United States. This word is sustainability. Of course, we typically think of sustainability as a way of describing the relationship between economic growth and environmental concerns. However, increasingly, sustainability can be turned to understand the process by which the post-colonial world was generally ordered and maintained during the cold-war period. There is very little debate about the role that the United States and the Soviet Union played in supporting non-democratically elected leaders throughout the world. These dictators and juntas were justified as being necessary to hold back the oncoming “red-wave” (or the powers of the capitalist imperialists). In many cases, these dictators were also supported in their efforts to control artificially constructed nation states, countries carved from post-colonial concerns with little or no thought given to existing demographic realities.

In the emerging multi polar moment, we increasingly see the word “sustainability” used to describe foreign policy. Since the revolutionary spirit first took hold in the streets of Cairo, the question of Israel emerged at the forefront of many minds. While Israeli fears of a Muslim Brotherhood dominated government in Cairo warrant consideration, the real question is one of sustainability. What does it say about the position of both Israel and the United States in the Middle East if the Israeli status quo can only be maintained by having a ring of dictatorships surround it? Clearly, this is not sustainable, and is in fact a relic of an older, diminishing world order.
This is particularly true in light of the other global forces described earlier. In a very real sense, we are seeing a potentially new moment of fragmentation; the breaking up of the unsustainable power structures that defined the geo-strategies of the cold-war and subsequent American global hegemony. While it may be soon to declare the twilight of the empire, it is clear that the international standing of the US has diminished and we are moving into a multipolar world. Furthermore, integration very much plays a role I defining the new sustainability. Those very same forces that drive globalization – cheap transportation and cheap communication – are connecting people all over the world in new venues of exchange, new communities that can share experiences of freedom, experiences of repression, yearnings and hopes. In a simple way, it means that young people in the Arab world can see what life is like in North America and Europe and say “We want that.” There are fewer blind spots, and while propaganda and information wars are still very much real, the truth is out there, and its available in a highly integrated and fast moving global culture.

This Arab Spring may well signal a historic moment, not just for Egypt, but for an emerging global order.

The Coming Storm

As events continue to unfold in Egypt, the million dollar question remains, "What's next?" The future shape of Egypt, and indeed the entire region is receiving a proper going over by the information machine. One topic in particular - the role of the Muslim Brotherhood - highlights the vast range of opinion and analysis and the inability to forecast when so much remains uncertain.

One thing is clear: there exists a momentum for change that does not appear to be abating anytime soon. Given Egypt's proximity to Gaza and its historical relationship to Israel, there is a strong sense that the outcome of the events in Tahrir Square will have cascading effects beyond the Rafah Crossing.

A confluence of forces, a perfect storm of sorts, may be bringing the plight of the Palestinian people to another significant historical moment. I had written on this very blog about the futility of the Obama administration's desire to jump start the peace process when it did. There were simply too many obstacles, and the momentum was towards a deepening divide between the sides, rather than rapprochement. As was to be expected, the peace talks fell flat. In December of the past year, Mahmoud Abbas threatened to dissolve the Palestinian Authority, placing the responsibility for administering the territories in Israel's hands. While this was seen by many as a bluff or an act of desperation, it did indeed signal the continued futility with which the PA attempted to steward the Palestinian cause.

At that time, many observers believed that dissolving the PA represented the best outcome for the Palestinians, as it may allow the resistance to enter a new phase, and press the UN directly for state recognition, or else move towards the One-State solution as both a practical and ideological matter. The recent release and dissemination of the "Palestinian Papers" put the final nail in the coffin of the PA. As Abdul Hadi, Palestinian rights advocate in Israel recently said, the papers revealed what the Palestinians had long feared: that the occupation was nothing more than imprisonment, and that the "PA Leaders are there only to negotiate the terms of imprisonment."

The idea of a rudderless resistance, without the PA, and with Fatah and Hamas still locked in seemingly intractable conflict would have potentially deadly consequences for the Palestinian cause. However, with the "Arab Spring" apparently upon us, it is possible that progressive and leftists elements in Palestine seize the moment to usher forth a third Intifada. Indeed, it may happen spontaneously and in populist fashion, as did the first Intifada. The PA leadership in general and Fatah in particular are suffering a deep crisis of perception, and it is likely that Hamas will align with the Muslim Brotherhood, from whence it was originally spawned. The MB may not be the winning horse in this race towards a free Egypt, and it is clear that groups like the PFLP, which had up till now operated largely in the shadow of Fatah, are siding with the "people of Egypt" and their democratic aspirations above all else.

A momentous shift in Palestinian affairs is likely for a lot of obvious reasons, and the protests in Egypt and Tunisia (Yemen, Jordan, Libya?) simply add to the probability of the Palestinians seizing the moment. It may not pretty. The Palestinians are among the most repressed and harassed people on Earth, and Israel may well use the opportunity of a shifting balance to pre-emptively punish the Palestinians to prevent the mobilization of their aspirations. Indeed, the schism between Hamas and Fatah may flair into a conflagration of dire proportion if a spontaneous rebellion emerges with no clear leadership.

Its clear change is upon us, and this change will undoubtedly change the face of the region for some time to come.

The Shape of Things to Come

Are we witnessing an "Arab Spring?" Events in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories are capturing the world's attention, as it seems that many people of the region are turning a corner. The sudden outbreak of democratic sentiment in the region is at once inspiring and disquieting. So many questions remain unanswered, and undoubtedly, only time will reveal the final form that these events will take.

Already, in Tunisia, we are witnessing the infant stages of post-revolutionary schism. While some of those involved in the movement to oust Ben Ali are prepared to proceed with an interim unity government, others demand that all remnants of the former regime be cleared from the government before any diminution of the revolutionary spirit begins. Whatever the final outcome, it seems - at least for the moment - that the Tunisian people are determining their destiny themselves.

With the fall of the March 14th led government in Beirut, Walid Jumblatt and Hezbollah have installed a new president and are in the process of forming a new government. Hezbollah appears to have significant popular support, and the Druze leader Jumblatt seems to have finally sided with the pan-Arabist aspirations of his forefathers. These recent events seem to repudiate March 14th's Pro-Western orientation. What remains to be seen is how Hariri will react; is this a time for entrenchment or engagement?

Events in Egypt continue to unfold. Even if Mubarak does not step down, his son possesses neither the support nor savvy to actually retain dynastic succession. Again, it is too early to know what will become of the protests currently erupting in the Egyptian street. However, there will no doubt be a fear-mongering campaign sponsored by Mubarak's regime suggesting that the fall of the government will automatically result in the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. This is a false dichotomy to be sure. While the Ikhwan has significant support, the Kefaya movement is by and large a secular movement that would likely throw significant support behind someone like Mohammad el Baradei. However, whatever the choice of Egyptian people in a post Mubarak age, for the first time in a long time it will be their choice alone.

The leaking of the now infamous "Palestinian Papers" is a significant, and perhaps historic event. I want to take a separate post to talk about them, as they contain much information, with still more being revealed everyday. However, one point must be made. Abu Mazen had very recently suggested that if Israeli concessions could not be made during the most recent round of negotiations, that the PA would dissolve and Israel would be made responsible for the administration of the territories. The release of these papers will hasten this reality, as popular support for the PA, and probably for Fatah, will wane to next to nothing.

More later . . .

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Switching to Dead Prez featuring Jay Z, Hell Yeah.

The track that justifies criminal activity as a form of reparations, or more probably as a means of resistance against a form of economic oppression that has left the inner city of America bereft of hope. “Ain’t you hungry my nigga, don’t you wanna get paid my nigga?” The chorus functions as revolutionary sloganeering: an inducement to embrace the post-revolutionary moment and take up arms in the name of preventing the complete effacement of a people. Dead Prez inhabits the space left by the Malcolm X/ Black Panther vision of the African American predicament. In some sense, it is possible to say that more mainstream rappers, such as Jay Z, Kanye West and 50 Cent present us with an accelerated version of minstrelsy, though not particularly buffoonish, as much as capitalizing and intensifying the ultraviolent and hyper-sexualized vision of the African American male as a caricature of white projections of the end of the civil rights project. As has often been said, the majority of the consumers of hip-hop and rap are white, suburbanites. The glorification of violence, misogyny and materialism found in mainstream rap music not only reflects the lack of developed economic systems in the inner city, but simultaneously reveals the hunger that the white mainstream culture has for sensational images of the other. In some perverse sense of order, the foregrounding of the “ghetto” as a signifier of authenticity reinforces in the minds of the white mainstream consumer the economic and cultural “arrival” of the African Americans in the post-civil rights moment.

The fact that this description conveys a colonized/colonizer dynamic should come as no surprise; rather than seeing the inner city as an important index of intentional and specific political and economic processes, it becomes a field of economic exploitation for the colonizer, and a field of desperation and perpetual conflict for the colonized. In this case, the product isn’t a material good, like a vital crop or mineral, but a set of cultural indicators and experiences whose initial vitality has been reduced to its most banal and libidinal elements.

And unless this set of dynamic interactions is understood, a track like W4 seems parodic at best and potentially absurd at worst.

“My J.O.B is just like a plantation.”

The critic charges that this is the worst sort of “complaint rap,” a parody of genuine revolutionary urge, transmuted into triviality and base simplicity. However, once the situation is perceived in terms of the near total economic disenfranchisement of the inner city (and thus, black and Hispanics) coupled with the simultaneous rigid codification and subsequent commodification of “street cred” and the extremely cynical and oppressive image of the “authentic OG,” the inner city street suddenly is more easily understood as being a kind of post-material plantation, a plantation of information and disembodied signification.

The video below is an attempt to use some multimedia tools to help tell a story, in this case, a brief primer on the country of Saudi Arabia.

Strange Bedfellows

Within the last week, the US administration has proposed large military aid packages to our “allies” in the terminal “war on terror.” Saudi Arabia will receive $60 billion worth of military aircraft, while Pakistan will receive $2 billion dollars in general military aid.

If anyone still thinks that our military adventure in Iraq, and our persistent efforts to assist in the creation of a stable Afghan state are motivated from a desire to spread democracy, our relationship with Saudi Arabia should shatter that illusion.

Several years ago, I wrote on this blog that the biggest terror threats in the world were to be found in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Pakistan. This was despite the fact that the media focus at that time echoed the US government line; that the greatest threats emanated from Iran and Iraq. The case of Yemen is a special one, and I will not examine that here. Saudi Arabia, however, remains the ideological and financial homeland of Al-Qaeda and its associated worldview. After oil, Saudi Arabia’s next most significant export is Wahhabi Islam. Its internal human rights record is abysmal, and democracy is virtually non-existent. This is a country where you can be executed – by public beheading – for the crime of “sorcery.” Of course, rather than the US supporting a genuine democratic movement in the Peninsula, it continues to support the Royal family, and thus secures preferential treatment with regards to access to oil. Furthermore, despite the US State Department trying to play down the assertion, it is clear that $60 billion worth of aircraft to the Saudis satisfies the desire of both the Kingdom and the US to contain Iran.

This represents a deep and dangerous cynicism. The US is upping the ante in a regional proxy war and simultaneously arming a country where political stability has thus far relied on heavy handed opposition to reform and an extensive police state apparatus.

Political stability in Saudi Arabia depends to a great extent on economic stability; in order for the relatively high per capita income of the Kingdom to be maintained, oil revenues must remain high, and the regime must fulfill its role as a basic instrument of income redistribution. Political reform has progressed at a snail’s pace, and internal security threats from Islamic fundamentalist groups continue to present a challenge to the regime. Providing such a large arms transfer to Saudi Arabia increases the long term threat of both regional and sovereign stability, as the Saudis are likely to use international conflict as an excuse for delaying crucial reforms at home.

Meanwhile, the military aid package for Pakistan similarly can only serve to escalate conflict in South and Central Asia, rather than contain it. The Pakistani regime, and indeed, the fate of Pakistan as a state in general, are at a crossroads. As I have recently written in this blog, the confluence of forces at play in Pakistan at the moment presents an existential crisis. It would seem that the US position is to throw more arms into the fray, and hope that the limping civilian administration in Pakistan can get a hold of things before the center collapses. The war in Afghanistan has become a war in Pakistan, and once again the US position suggests that the only way out is for the Pakistanis to completely eliminate the Taliban and Al-Qaeda affiliated groups, and return to some kind of imagined stability. However, the true crisis in Pakistan isn’t simply Islamic militancy, it is an institutional crisis. I don’t believe that an outright military victory over the Taliban and associated groups can actually be achieved. The fact that elements within Afghanistan’s government are continuously attempting to court the Taliban leadership into some kind of reconciliation process proves that the forces of Fundamental Islam will be part of both countries for the foreseeable forces. Rather than encouraging a de-facto arms race in South Asia, the US should be investing in a future civilian government that can encourage democratic reform and stable civilian governance, with the hope of creating an atmosphere conducive to economic development.

This is the only hope of long term stability. However, cynicism and the belief that military force can achieve positive future outcomes rule the day.

The Specter of the Enemy

An unnamed NATO source, one believed to be involved in day to day operations in Afghanistan, has recently claimed, apparently with some certainty, that Osama Bin Laden is alive and well in Pakistan. Rather than living in a cave, as some have come to believe, the Al-Qaeda number one is resting comfortably somewhere in the northern areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, possibly in or near the Kurram Valley.
Great, so we got him, right?
I imagine anyone who has followed the war in Afghanistan – and the war on terror generally – would not be at all surprised by the idea that Bin Laden and Zawahiri are in Pakistan. There have been numerous statements over the past several years to suggest it, and in fact it is one of the few possible scenarios that make any sense. If the rumors concerning Bin Laden’s need for a kidney dialysis machine are true, the “hiding out in a cave” scenario loses credibility.
Richard Holbrooke was quoted in The Guardian as saying that “we hardly have a day go by” without someone claiming to know Bin Laden’s whereabouts. The thing that’s interestingly absent from Holbrooke’s statement is where the US thinks he is. When the news of the NATO official came out, the Washington Post claimed the “mystery” may finally be solved. Mystery? There are only so many places he could be, right?
Clearly, Holbrooke is right about the fact that this isn’t the first time someone has claimed to know where the world’s most wanted man is hiding. In 2003, Indian General KPS Gill claimed that he had firsthand information that the Pakistani ISI knew of Bin Laden’s whereabouts. In 2006, Ahmad Rashid stated unequivocally that Bin Laden was in Pakistan. Yet each one of these claims was met by the same reaction, the latest iteration being Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik stating in Dawn that there is no truth to the NATO official’s claim, and such statements are being used to “malign Pakistan.”
I am not privy to classified information; I am not an intelligence specialist. However, I have been following these events in some detail for years. But I don’t suspect it takes much of an expert to come to the conclusion that Bin Laden and indeed, the leadership of Al Qaeda, is hiding in either the FATA or North or South Waziristan. If anything, the “maligning” of Pakistan is a simple indictment of the fact that these vast Pashtun areas along the Afghani border are completely beyond Pakistani control. Furthermore, knowing where Bin Laden is (even generally) does not mean that the US can simply “go in and get him.” It sounds ironic, considering we just “went in” and got Saddam, and just “went in” and went after the Taliban. However, with Pakistan we are dealing with a very precarious and difficult case. Pakistani sovereignty, the future stability of the state and nuclear weapons all conspire to make any US intervention deep into Pakistani territory a very dangerous tightrope act.
And it is this situation that makes a direct assault on Al Qaeda by US forces impossible at this current moment. However, there may be one other possible perspective here. I don’t want to sound like a conspiracy nut of some kind, but I think it is distinctly possible to view Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in the context of their propaganda value. There is no question that the American, and indeed global, public were subject to many exaggerations and sometimes outright lies regarding both Al-Qaeda and Iraq in the last several years. Remember the initial descriptions of the caves of Tora Bora by Donald Rumsfeld? It read like something out of an Ian Fleming novel. And let’s not forget the string of dishonesties regarding Iraq. The bottom line, governments have always understood the power of nightmares. Sometimes the threat is in fact real, but the details are blown out of proportion, or simplified to make the image of the enemy stark and easy to understand. This latter dimension is precisely why Bin Laden represents such an effective propaganda tool. Like Orwell’s Goldstein, Bin Laden becomes the repository of all of our projected, collective fears, an agent of chaos, with obscure religious views (though no religious credentials!), a single minded focus on destruction, a deep seated hatred of “civilization” at large. Even his physical appearance in many ways typifies the feared image of the dangerous oriental, dark, swarthy, with a hooked nose and a discordant effeminate quality. And most importantly, he is uncomplicated. Compare Bin Laden to Hassan Nasrallah. The Hezbollah leader has repeated numerous times that his movement is involved in a local struggle. Nasrallah condemned the events of 9/11, he is a savvy, public, and charismatic figure. Indeed, Nasrallah is polarizing, but he is not surrounded by the aura of myth, he is multi-dimensional and arguments can be made that will sympathize with his positions (albeit with great contentiousness). Even the most ardent anti-war leftists risk total ridicule if they attempt to justify Bin Laden’s position. Al Qaeda and its leadership represent the perfect Manichean Devil, an emotionally potent oversimplification that stirs the imagination as much, if not more than, the intellect and thus, has a certain value to the fear machine if he remains elusive and alive.

Chess Anyone?

The recent elections in Iraq have left the country with a dangerous political deadlock. With neither Iyad Allawi’s Iraqqiya bloc nor Maliki’s State of Law bloc pulling a majority in the Parliament, the game of coalition building is in full swing. However, a parallel game is being played out, and it is about regional influence and may well shape the future of Iraq’s role in the Middle East for decades to come.

Since the 2003 invasion, Moqtada al-Sadr has emerged as a major x-factor in Iraqi politics. Commanding the dispossessed, poor, urban Shia population, the young scion emerged as an international figure by openly declaring resistance against the U.S. and coalition presence in Iraq. The Mahdi Army became a force to be reckoned with, and Sadr himself quickly became a figure of national prominence and influence. Perhaps more importantly, he became the most visible conduit of Iranian influence in Iraq. There is little doubt that the Mahdi Army received funding, as well as material and logistical support from Iranian Revolutionary Guard elements. This intimate relationship between the Sadrists and Iran was the natural outcome of co-religiosity, political opportunism, and international gamesmanship. And now, with the election leaving a leadership vacuum, Sadr and Iran again have entered the fray in a significant way.

Maliki has travelled to Tehran, and plans to go to Qom as well. It is clear that in going to Tehran, Maliki is hoping to not only show that he has an open door to both Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, but that he can convince the Iranians to use their influence on Sadr as well. Part of the reason that Sadr has been so quiet the last few years is that he realized that his future success in both Iraq and the region depends on his attaining his religious credentials. Thus, the young mullah has returned to the academies of Qom while his party plots its future political strategy.

Maliki is going to lean on Sadr and hope that he can get the Sadrist seats into a ruling coalition. This will mean a strongly pro-Iranian government in Baghdad. To be sure, the American’s are playing their cards at the moment as well. Statements from Allawi read almost like State Department press releases. Everyone has a horse in this race, and once again, the self-determination of ordinary Iraqis is being sacrificed for political machination and regional gamesmanship.

Gutenberg 2.0, and the Death of the object

Today I want to take a short break from our usual fare and begin a short series on the state of professional media in the age of Web 2.0. So let's jump in.

What is Web 2.0? As Andrew Keen has pointed out, the term itself is not so much an intentional nomenclature that indicates a new set of inventions or practices, but was rather a term developed by media observers to describe a sort of historical moment characterized by the post 2000 NASDAQ crash and the explosion of what we now call "social media," i.e Facebook, Youtube, Digg etc. In general, the idea of Web 2.0centers around the idea of user-generated content, and the potential to liberate media from the "Gatekeepers" of traditional mainstream media.

The above description is loaded with points of interest and potential contention. However, I don't want to engage all of those issues at the outset. I would like to begin (as may be appropriate in Web 2.0) with a personal story.

The two industries seemingly most affected by the rise of digital technology and the information economy are the music industry and journalism. When I was in high school, the Internet was still very, very nascent in its development. I used to mail order vinyl records from a small punk rock outfit in Goleta, California. When the sides arrived from Ebullition records, there were always goodies; sometimes free zines, band stickers, mail order catalogs from other indie labels. Pulling those packages out of the mail and locking myself in my room was a gleeful ritual. I would put the records on, hold the covers in my hands, look at the lyrics and artwork inserts, and while away the hours in angst ridden bliss (I did mention these were punk rock records, right?). Now, before you accuse me of romanticizing the "physical object," keep in mind that from a young age I was a collector. For awhile it was hockey and baseball cards, then comic books, and eventually music. Perhaps there is a pathology associated with "collecting," but for me and my friends, the association with these small, mail order record labels, the bands that they promoted and the scene in which everyone was involved constituted a community. Furthermore, these objects played the role of our communal artifacts.

To be sure, digital technology has killed the physical artifact. Some may point to isolated situations in which a hardcore minority insist on purchasing CD's or vinyl, but in 2010, these are the real New Romantics. I myself have succumbed and surrendered to iTunes, because I want my music with me everywhere I go. And I doubt anyone in the moribund music industry will tell you that there is hope on the horizon. Web 2.0 has destroyed the old business model of the recording industry, that is beyond debate. The question which remains, is whether or not this is a good thing.

It's a complicated question and cannot be answered in a short blog entry, so my goal here is to present a series of interlocking themes to widen the discussion. On the one hand, there are those who argue that with the dinosaur record industry out of the way, the artist can be in complete control of all aspects of the creation and marketing of their music, and can do so at relatively low cost. This is the "democratization" of media that the champions of Web 2.0 espouse as their central ideology. This raises for me two central questions. First, has this leveling of the technological playing field made it any easier for musicians to make a living from their music? Certainly, they have more control, and are not beholden to the infamous "exploitation" of the labels, but they now must operate in an ever widening field of competition, and since digital music can just as often be pirated rather than purchased, does this reduce the resources available for bands to harness their craft and raise their level of ability against an increase of competitors in the field? The second question is related to this, and involves the role that the labels played as "Gatekeepers." Part of the investment in the production of the physical object was an investment in bands that were deemed to have sufficient talent, which was then harnessed and polished by A&R people, professional marketers and the taste makers at the labels. These are all very naughty concepts in Web 2.0, yet is something lost when no one is willing to invest in individuals whose sole purpose is to separate the wheat from the chaff? The flattened media proponents will say that "the people" will decide. In other words, the logic of the free market must operate unhindered by the "regulation" of old media authority.

I don't want to propose a final verdict on any of these questions as much as I want to begin the discussion. Suffice it to say that it seems to me that we are at a point where it cannot be regarded as a zero-sum game, and there will be a place for both taste makers and authority, as well as direct democratic content generation. The issue of authority and the gatekeepers will be extended in the next post, as I think this is a particularly vital issue in the discussion about the future of journalism.

Stay tuned, and leave comments!

The Morality of Occupation

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/10/201010514447409589.html

A recent video posted to youtube shows an IDF soldier "belly dancing" and gyrating mockingly while a Palestinian woman stands bound and blindfolded against a wall. Ghosts of Abu Ghraib, the darkest and most cynical dehumanization. The ensuing dialogue about the incident will no doubt follow a familiar formula. The Army will declare the offending soldiers "bad apples," why critics and human rights groups will insist that occupation brings out the worst tendencies in otherwise ordinary people.

I suspect that the reality of such incidents isn't explained by one or the other argument alone, but some combination of both. And ultimately, trying to parse out whether the offending soldiers began as "bad apples" or were somehow induced to aberrant behavior by the brutal reality of geopolitics would be futile. However, what this incident reminds us is that often what gets the most attention and generates the most debate are incidents where the crimes involve some level of deviance or salaciousness.

"If it bleeds it leads," so the old saying goes. However, in the U.S. press, the bleeding of some is more news worthy than the bleeding of others. It was clear during the Abu Ghraib incident that this moment of strange and deviant dehumanization emerged as a focal point for opposition to the occupation of Iraq, and a lightning rod for anti-American sentiment in the Islamic World. There is no doubt that such events damage the moral standing of nations that insist that their interventions are either purely defensive or even benevolent, as in Iraq and Afghanistan. To be sure, these are important stories which focus a bright light on occupation and its effects. However, I contend that perhaps these things are just aberrations, and obscure the daily crimes of occupying armies.

As far the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I doubt most Americans know the price paid in the blood of the "natives." In fact, the case of Iraq has been so mired in misinformation that there is significant variation in Iraqi death toll estimates among informed observers. Similarly, the figures for civilian deaths in Afghanistan are difficult to verify. Good records were simply not kept during the opening years of the war, and the reporting of civilian casualties in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand were compromised by the dire security situation. During the decades of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, numerous human rights groups have kept records of Palestinian civilian deaths at the hands of the IDF (links to Al Mezan and B'Tselem can be found in the links section to the right). The deaths of course are not all attributable to American or Israeli military action. What is not accounted for in the statistical data is the daily abuse, the checkpoints, house searches, demolitions, curfews and random arrests and detentions.

So incidents like the belly dancing IDF soldier and Abu Ghraib perhaps ultimately are aberrations. The background events of occupation are more directly and obviously brutal, they lack the color of psychological deviance, and rather embody the logic of empire. If such incidents bring focus to the conditions of occupation, all the better. However, our outrage - and attention - must remain focused on the daily crimes committed in these seemingly endless conflicts.

The Darkening Horizon

A perfect storm is brewing in Pakistan, a storm that will have regional and international implications of great consequence. In the immediate, Pakistanis themselves suffer. The war in Afghanistan has not abated, despite 9 years of fighting. In fact, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have become a particularly dangerous battleground for a war that has now spread into Pakistani territory and threatens a fragile civilian establishment. The Obama administration continues to pursue a policy of measured response to insurgents within Pakistani territory, relying principally on unmanned drones to conduct raids in the tribal regions. However, there are few within Pakistan’s security apparatus that could rightfully deny the presence of US military assets operating from within Pakistan’s borders, fueling deep mistrust and resentment of the rulers in Islamabad. Rather than containing the Taliban to their homeland in the southern provinces of Afghanistan, a new front rages in the FATA that now threatens Pakistani stability. By and large, there has been a concession by the Pakistani security establishment that its long-held strategy of covert support for Islamist groups (including the Taliban) has backfired. The basically institutional view that Islamist proxies could be used by the ISI to exert influence in Afghanistan and thus provide a counter to Indian influence and strength has collapsed.

The floods in Pakistani defy description. The sheer scale (an area the size of England affected) of the tragedy must give us pause. The international community has pledged aid, and this will likely provide a modicum of relief. However, as is so often the case, those affected by this tragedy were among the poorest of Pakistani society, so while international relief may ease the transition from disaster to some semblance of normalcy, ordinary Pakistanis will return to the equilibrium state of an overall lack of development. Even prior to the floods, the amount of spending on education and health was woefully insufficient. Islamabad has not implemented any long term planning strategy for the agriculture or manufacturing sectors, and Pakistan is now importing wheat. The booming IT sector in India – a vital factor in that nation’s rise in global prominence – is all but non-existent in Pakistan. The overall lack of economic activity within Pakistan has resulted in a meager tax base, and continued dependence on foreign aid.

To be sure, these are massive challenges for any government. However, as if adding fuel to long burning fire, Pakistan may soon be faced with a Parliamentary crisis. The ruling PPP-PML(N) coalition shows signs of fragility, and it’s hard to imagine that Nawaz Sharif will expend efforts to repair the breach rather than shore up support for his own coalition should a no-confidence vote be held against Zardari and the PPP. However, the greater threat to Zardari may be from within his own party. There is virtually no debating Zardari’s cronyism, and recent events seem to find Zardari tightening his inner circle while excluding competent and respected senior PPP officials. Naheed Khan was recently quoted as stating that the PPP is becoming a “one man show.” Both she and her husband, Safdar Abbasi are senior officials in the PPP, and its Khan’s assertion that Zardari is closing ranks and surrounding himself with people that lack competence in governance. The PPP’s Executive Committee recently convened to discuss current matters of state, and Abbasi’s absence was conspicuous. Zardari does himself – and ultimately Pakistan – a great disservice by denying capable technocrats access to the levers of power at such a critical time in Pakistan’s history.

Perhaps most alarming is projecting what may happen in the case of a no confidence vote in Parliament. PML-N would emerge as the default ruling party. However, given the current composition of the Parliament, creating a coalition that could withstand a further no-confidence vote poses a significant challenge. In such a case, a general election would be required. The time frame for an election will be crucial, as maintaining security will become an absolute necessity. The announcement of a general election will undoubtedly inspire Taliban action. The worst case scenario is that the security situation deteriorates to the point where a legitimate vote cannot be held, and the military must intercede to provide continuity of governance, a familiar narrative in Pakistani history. While most accounts of General Kayani paint him as a mostly apolitical figure, he did once preside over ISI, an institution that believes that they alone should determine Pakistan’s destiny. Furthermore, military rule in Pakistan may be well received by a US administration desperate for a competent and capable partner in Pakistan. Previous administrations certainly were not squeamish about supporting military rule, and the most cynical view in Washington has long believed that it’s exactly what Pakistan requires.

The stakes are incredibly high. For the poorest Pakistanis, the fragile middle classes in Lahore and Karachi, and for the ruling elites, the moment dances on a knife edge. The dream of Jinnah remains deferred. The only question left is for how much longer?

Voices in the Wilderness

In late 2003, I started working with Professor Elie Chalala at his magazine, Al-Jadid. Having come out of university with a degree in Comparative Literature, a working knowledge of French and a deep interest in post-colonial issues in the Middle East and south Asia, it was the perfect venue for me. I knew it would give me an opportunity to write to edit and to stay in touch with contemporary trends. what I didn't know is how much it would teach me about the importance and power of dissent.

I think we in the West often underestimate the power of a repressive government. After 9/11, many in the West asked "where is the moderate Muslim denunciation of these acts, where are the voices of reason." Many in the West were led to believe that maybe such voices didn't exist. However, the fact that moderate voices didn't make it to the pages of the Times or the Post was less a function of their existence, and more so about the fact that they are under constant threat of severe repression.

In many countries in the Middle East, the most critical voices are academics, artists, journalists and opposition activists. These groups are also among the most heavily scrutinized, harassed and oppressed populations in that part of the world. The fact is quite simple: Moderate and dissenting voices exist and toil arduously throughout Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere. However, we in the West - who often take our freedom of speech for granted - cannot begin to fathom what life must be like for a journalist who must choose between self-censorship or torture, or an artist who must choose between tempering of passion or arrest.

Al Jadid has strived to bring these voices to a wider audience, to prevent them from being drowned in a sea of fundamentalist and statist propaganda. I may be biased by my personal involvement with the magazine, but that cannot detract from the vital role that such content can play in a time when the dialogue about the Middle East suffers from irrational polarization. Al Jadid shows us the possibilities of the Middle East; this region has inherited more than just Islamism, it still has traces of Pan-Arabism, Socialism, as well as artistic and literary traditions descended from one of humanity's great civilizations. This is a vision of the Middle East that must be at the forefront of the discussion, rather than shackled and hidden away.

I will place a description and link to Al-Jadid in the Resources section of this website. Please head over and take a look.

aljadid.com

All best . . .